For
many decades, federal law enforcement has used electronic
surveillance, including wiretaps, to obtain incriminating
evidence for criminal investigations of mobsters and drug
traffickers. From a prosecutor’s viewpoint, there
is no better evidence in a criminal case than being able
to play the defendant’s own incriminating words for
the
jury.
John Gotti learned this lesson the hard way after being
acquitted in several jury trials. The FBI finally caught
the “Teflon Don” by bugging an apartment above
a social club that Gotti frequented. With the FBI hearing
every word, Gotti talked openly with his business associates
about his criminal activities. The prosecution played numerous
recordings from the bugs at trial. Gotti was finally convicted
based largely upon his own words.1
Wall
Street executives have been largely immune from the specter
of wiretaps on business telephones and corporate board meetings.
Times have changed. To avoid a paper trail, executives are
more circumspect in what they put down on paper and what
they type in e-mails.2 Now, federal
law enforcement is using the power of Title III3
wire interception and electronic surveillance to go after
oral communications of targets in
white collar investigations.
The
use of electronic surveillance evidence to arrest billionaire
Raj Rajaratnam4 of the hedge fund
Galleon Group on insider trading charges has many business
executives thinking twice about what they say on the telephone.
Media reports and legal experts noted that the use of wiretaps
to collect evidence in a white collar case was dramatic
change in investigation techniques.5
Distinguishing between wiretaps and other types
of electronic surveillance
There
is some misconception as to what constitutes a wiretap under
Title III. By statute, wire communication “means any
aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use
of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between
the point of origin and the point of reception ... furnished
or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating
such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communication or communications affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.”6 Contrary
to television and movie depictions, consensual bodywire
or consensually monitored telephonic recordings7
by a confidential informant or a ooperating witness are
not wiretaps. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace orders8
are also not wiretaps.
The federal statute governing the recording of telephone
conversations is 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d). This statute states,
in relevant part:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral,
or electronic communication where such person is a party
to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State.
Telephone conversations fall within the ambit of “wire
communications.” Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications,
929 F. Supp. 1362, 1375-76 (D. Kan. 1996) (“A telephone
conversation is a wire conversation.”) (internal quotation
omitted). Thus, federal law only requires one party to a
telephone conversation to consent to the recording. See
Roberts v. Americable Intern. Inc., 883 F. Supp.
499, 503 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(d), “the interception of oralcommunication
is not unlawful ... where a party to the conversation is
either the one who has intercepted the conversation or who
has consented to the interception, and the interception
is not for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious
act”).
A party is exempt from the wiretap prohibitions of Title
III where at least
one of the parties to the telephone conversation has consented
to the interception. Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d
271, 281 (1st Cir.1993); Watkins v. L.M. Berry &
Co., 704 F.2d 577, 580-81 (11th Cir.1983). While consent
under Title III need not be explicit and may be implied,
Williams, 11 F.3d at 281, it is “not to be cavalierly
implied”, Watkins, 704 F.3d at 581. Implied consent
is consent in fact, which is inferred from surrounding
circumstances indicating that the party knowingly agreed
to the recording. Id.
Aside
from law enforcement obtaining a court order to listen to
phone conversations, federal law allows a business to record
telephone calls in the “ordinary course of business”
if criteria is followed for the recordings. See Adams
v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir.)(“‘Ordinary
course of business’ is not defined in the statute,
but it generally requires that the use be (1) for a legitimate
business purpose, (2) routine and (3) with notice.”),
pet. for reh’g en banc denied, (6th Cir. 2001).
Title
III Process and Requirements
Unlike
a grand jury subpoena or search warrant, a wiretap involves
a substantial amount of work on law enforcement’s
behalf before it can be authorized.
In a nutshell, a Title III requires a showing of probable
cause, necessity, and exhaustion of traditional investigative
techniques. The wiretap tatutes
(18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.) have explicit and detailed
requirements in order to establish probable cause9
exists for a particular telephone to be tapped. Thelaw enforcement
agent must provide a lengthy affidavit that explains the
factual basis for the belief that a particular telephone
(the “target telephone”) is being utilized for
criminal activity. The affidavit becomes the basis for an
application by the assistant U.S. attorney
(AUSA) who will review, edit, and rewrite the document.
After the AUSA approves the affidavit, he or she must then
submit the draft affidavit and Title III application to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in Washington, D.C., for
review and approval. Only after approval by the DOJ can
the AUSA present the Title III application and affidavit
to a federal judge for review and authorization for 30 days
of wire interception on the target telephone.
Showing Necessity for a Wiretap
The government must show the necessity for the wiretap by
proving it has exhausted traditional investigative techniques
in the process.10 Traditional tools used by law enforcement
include grand jury subpoenas, confidential informants, search
warrants, pen registers and trap & trace devices, trash
searches, etc. The government must show how these tools
have been used and why they have failed to uncover the criminal
conduct. When the government fails to show necessity, the
wiretap evidence may be suppressed.11 In
the Galleon investigation, the defense filed motions to
suppress the wiretaps based on the allegations that necessity
was not established because the government had evidence
from other testimony and documents produced pursuant to
subpoenas from the SEC.11
DOJ Approval Before Taking a Wiretap Application
to the Court
The DOJ’s Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO) must
review and approve the wiretap application and affidavit
before the prosecutor ever presents the documents to a federal
district court judge to review. OEO acts as a gatekeeper
for Title III applications. Its attorneys scrutinize wiretap
affidavits to determine whether or not necessity has been
established for interception of the target telephone. The
affidavit is often rewritten several times if it appears
that the law enforcement agents have not
articulated all the traditional investigative efforts that
have been attempted in the case.
Once the OEO approves the affidavit, a DOJ associate attorney
general provides authorization for the AUSA to present the
Title III application and affidavit to the court for review.12
Upon approval, the AUSA and agents have the responsibility
of adhering to minimization requirements. Even with the
wiretap order, the agents are only permitted to listen to
pertinent telephone calls that are associated with the criminal
offenses under investigation. Agents who fail to minimize
(i.e., stop listening) during nonpertinent phone calls run
the risk that the wiretap evidence may be later suppressed.
The government also is required to submit periodic reports
(every 10 days) to the court that provide the number of
calls that were intercepted and a summary of information
on pertinent calls.
After the 30-day period of interception ends (and assuming
there is no extension granted by the court), the government
must promptly seal the tapes.13 Within
a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after interception,
the government must send out notices of interception to
anyone who was intercepted on the wiretap.14
Prosecutors will often seek delays in sending out
the notices when there is an ongoing
investigation. Eventually, the notices go out and the interceptees
receive official word that the government was listening
to their conversations on the target telephone.
Conclusion
DOJ is now aggressively using wiretaps and electronic surveillance
in federal white collar investigations. The recent use of
these tools to obtain evidence in white collar investigations
should place executives on notice that they need to be concerned
who may be listening to conversations on telephone calls
when criminal activity is suspected.
Craig
S. Denney is counsel at Downey Brand LLP, board certified
in criminal law by the National Board of Trial Advocacy.
He is a former federal prosecutor who represents corporate
and individual clients in white collar criminal defense
and government egulatory matters in federal and state courts
in Nevada and California.
Endnotes
1 Selwyn Raab, Five Families (St. Martin’s
Press, New York, 2006).
2
See United States v. Frank Quattrone, (S.D.N.Y.),
federal indictment charged executive with obstruction of
justice based on e-mail message to coworkers during federal
investigation regarding the firm’s document destruction
policy, p. 27, ¶39 (“We strongly suggest that
before you leave for the holidays, you should catch up on
filing cleaning.”).
3 “Title III” gets its name from
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
Wiretaps are now covered in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522.
4 Glovin, David, David Scheer, and Bob Van Voris,
Galleon Case Ushers in Wiretaps for Financial Crimes, Bloomberg
(Oct. 17, 2009).
5 Kiviat, Barbara, Arrests Open a Window on
Hedge-Fund Culture, Time (Oct. 21, 2009) (Stetson University
law professor Ellen Podgor was quoted in the article stating:
“This is a monumental step for the government ...
This is not the typical way you do a white-collar case.”).
6 18 U.S.C 2510(1)
7 Bodywires refer to placement of a concealed
recording device on an informant for a face-to-face meeting
with a target. No court authorization is needed for this
type of investigative work in federal investigations. Consensual
telephone monitoring involves the informant making a recorded
call in the presence of the agent who records the audio
conversation. No court authorization needed for this investigative
technique
in federal cases.
8 Pen Registers refer to a device that records
the phone numbers that a target telephone calls. Trap and
Trace refers to a device that records the phone numbers
that call the target telephone. These tools only record
the phone numbers not the conversations on the calls. Pen
Registers and Trap and Trace devices are used to develop
evidence to seek a wiretap on the target telephone.
9
The probable cause for a wiretap is more stringent
that for a standard search warrant. The evidence that the
target telephone is being used for criminal activity must
be clearly shown in the affidavit. Generally, as a rule
of thumb, DOJ wants a “dirty call” on the target
telephone within 21 days of seeking the wiretap approval.
See, e.g., DOJ Manual on Federal Narcotics Prosecutions.
This requires the investigators to provide a lengthy affidavit
with all facts to establish probable cause.
10 “Necessity” in Title III refers to
the government’s showing that the goal of the investigation
could not be obtained through normal investigative techniques.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c)(3)(“Upon such application
the judge may enter an ex parte order ... authorizing ...
interception of ... electronic communications ... if the
judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by
the applicant that ... normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”); See
Kalar, Steven and Josh Cohen, Uncle Sam Is On The Line:
A Title III (Wiretap) Primer. (Aug. 18-20, 2005).
11 Defense counsel should scrutinize the Title III
affidavit’s necessity section which may sometimes
contain boilerplate necessity language with short shrift
of facts showing the investigative techniques were pursued
and failed.
12 Kouwe, Zachery, Galleon Chief Accuses S.E.C. of
Violations, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2009).
13 Title III applications by statute must be approved
by federal judges. (18 U.S.C. §§ 2518 and 3127).
District court judges review wiretap applications. Magistrates
handle applications for pen registers and trap and trace
devices which are typically implemented on the target telephone
in the investigation in order to develop probable
cause and necessity for the Title III.
14 The reference to tapes is antiquated since the
recordings are now digitally recorded on a CD. 1518 U.S.C.
§ 2518(8)(d).
Published by the Criminal Law Section
of the Federal Bar Association